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iiiThe direct costs of federal environmental, health, and safety
regulations are probably on the order of $200 billion an-
nually, or about the size of all federal domestic, nondefense
discretionary spending. The benefits of those regulations
are even less certain. Evidence suggests that some recent
regulations would pass a benefit-cost test while others would
not.
The growing impact of regulations on the economy
has led both Congress and the administration to search for
new ways of reforming regulation. Many of those regula-
tory reform initiatives call for greater reliance on the use
of economic analysis in the development and evaluation of
regulations. Because ideological extremes have dominated
debate on this topic, a dispassionate commentary may be
particularly valuable.
On September 29, 1995, a group of leading econo-
mists met to discuss the role of economic analysis in the
development of environmental, health, and safety regula-
tion. The meeting was sponsored jointly by the American
Enterprise Institute, the Annapolis Center, and Resources
Preface
vfor the Future and was cochaired by Robert W. Hahn and
Paul R. Portney. We would like to thank Harrison H.
Schmitt, chairman of the Annapolis Center, for providing
us with the resources necessary to undertake this endeavor.
The following economists participated in the meeting:
Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University
Maureen L. Cropper, World Bank
George C. Eads, Charles River Associates, Inc.
Robert W. Hahn, American Enterprise Institute
Lester B. Lave, Carnegie Mellon University
Roger G. Noll, Stanford University
Paul R. Portney, Resources for the Future
Milton Russell, University of Tennessee
Richard Schmalensee, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
V. Kerry Smith, Duke University
Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University
The following report summarizes the key findings of
our group. It consists of an executive summary along with
a more detailed statement of the principles the group de-
veloped. The principles are divided into two sections. The
first provides some guidance for decisionmakers on using
economic analysis to evaluate laws and regulations. The
second offers specific suggestions for improving the qual-
ity of economic analysis in regulatory decisionmaking. We
hope that those findings will stimulate a reasoned discus-
sion of the appropriate role of economic analysis in the
development of regulations.
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Executive Summary
1
Benefit-cost analysis can play a very important role in legis-
lative and regulatory policy debates on improving the envi-
ronment, health, and safety. It can help illustrate the
tradeoffs that are inherent in public policymaking as well
as make those tradeoffs more transparent. It can also help
agencies set regulatory priorities.
Benefit-cost analysis should be used to help
decisionmakers reach a decision. Contrary to the views of
some, benefit-cost analysis is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for designing sensible public policy. If properly done,
it can be very helpful to agencies in the decisionmaking
process.
Decisionmakers should not be precluded from con-
sidering the economic benefits and costs of different poli-
cies in the development of regulations. Laws that prohibit
costs or other factors from being considered in administra-
tive decisionmaking are inimical to good public policy. Cur-
rently, several of the most important regulatory statutes have
been interpreted to imply such prohibitions.
Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major2  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
regulatory decisions, but agency heads should not be bound
by a strict benefit-cost test. Instead, they should be required
to consider available benefit-cost analyses and to justify the
reasons for their decision in the event that the expected
costs of a regulation far exceed the expected benefits. Agen-
cies should be encouraged to use economic analysis to help
set regulatory priorities. Economic analyses prepared in
support of particularly important decisions should be sub-
jected to peer review both inside and outside government.
Benefits and costs of proposed major regulations
should be quantified wherever possible. Best estimates
should be presented along with a description of the uncer-
tainties. Not all benefits or costs can be easily quantified,
much less translated into dollar terms. Nevertheless, even
qualitative descriptions of the pros and cons associated with
a contemplated action can be helpful. Care should be taken
to ensure that quantitative factors do not dominate impor-
tant qualitative factors in decisionmaking.
The Office of Management and Budget, or some other
coordinating agency, should establish guidelines that agen-
cies should follow in conducting benefit-cost analyses. Those
guidelines should specify default values for the discount rate
and certain types of benefits and costs, such as the value of a
small reduction in mortality risk. In addition, agencies should
present their results using a standard format, which summa-
rizes the key results and highlights major uncertainties.ARROW ET AL. 3
3
Principle 1: A benefit-cost analysis is a useful way of organizing
a comparison of the favorable and unfavorable effects of proposed
policies.
Benefit-cost analysis can help the decisionmaker better
understand the implications of a decision. It should be used
to inform decisionmakers. Benefit-cost analysis can provide
useful estimates of the overall benefits and costs of pro-
posed policies. It can also assess the impacts of proposed
policies on consumers, workers, and owners of firms and
can identify potential winners and losers.
In many cases, benefit-cost analysis cannot be used to
prove that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed
or fall short of the costs. There is simply too much uncer-
tainty in some of the estimates of benefits and costs to make
such statements with a high degree of confidence.
Benefit-cost analysis should play an important role in
informing the decisionmaking process, even when the in-
formation on benefits, costs, or both is highly uncertain, as
is often the case with regulations involving the environment,
health, and safety. The estimation of benefits and costs of a
Principles
Part One: Guidance for Decisionmakers on
Using Economic Analysis to Evaluate
Proposed Policies4  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
proposed regulation can provide illuminating evidence for a
decision, even if precision cannot be achieved because of limi-
tations on time, resources, or the availability of information.
Principle 2: Economic analysis can be useful in designing regu-
latory strategies that achieve a desired goal at the lowest possible
cost.
Too frequently, environmental, health, and safety regula-
tion has used a one-size-fits-all or command-and-control
approach. Economic analysis can highlight the extent to
which cost savings can be achieved by using alternative,
more flexible approaches that reward performance. Per-
formance standards and market-based approaches are gen-
erally preferable to command-and-control approaches
because they can achieve the same objective at a lower to-
tal cost to society. A recent example is the market-based
approach used to reduce emissions that cause acid rain.
That approach was estimated to be much less expensive
than an alternative under consideration that would have
required large power plants to install scrubbers.
Principle 3: Congress should not preclude decisionmakers from
considering the economic benefits and costs of different policies in
the development of regulations. At the very least, agencies should be
encouraged to use economic analysis to help set regulatory priorities.
Sections of some statutes, such as parts of the Clean Air Act
and the Delaney Clause, explicitly prohibit the balancing
of benefits and costs in the development of regulations.
Removing such prohibitions can help promote more effi-
cient and effective regulation of the environment, health,
and safety.
To make better use of society’s resources, Congress
should encourage regulatory agencies to use economic
analysis in planning their regulatory agenda. Current plan-
ning in most regulatory agencies places insufficient empha-
sis on the likely benefits and costs of regulations andARROW ET AL. 5
excessive emphasis on politics and deadlines. Congress
should consider changing that emphasis by explicitly ask-
ing agencies to consider the benefits and costs of policies
in formulating agendas.
Principle 4: Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major
regulatory decisions.
While the precise definition of major requires some judg-
ment, we believe that a major regulation should be one
whose annual economic cost is expected to be greater than
$100 million. We also believe that this requirement should
be applied to independent agencies as well as to executive
branch agencies. An important benefit of mandatory benefit-
cost analysis is that it facilitates external monitoring of an
agency’s performance and thus makes it easier to hold
agency heads accountable.
The scale of a benefit-cost analysis should depend on
both the stakes involved and the likelihood that the result-
ing information will affect the ultimate decision. Other
things equal, agencies should devote more resources to
analyzing problems where the stakes are greater. A full-
blown benefit-cost analysis, however, can be costly. There-
fore, the agency should not perform the analysis unless
there is some likelihood that doing so will actually inform
the regulatory decision. Informing the decision could in-
volve changing the goal of the regulation or the means by
which a particular goal is achieved.
Principle 5: Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost
test, but should be required to consider available benefit-cost analy-
ses. For regulations whose expected costs far exceed expected ben-
efits, agency heads should be required to present a clear explanation
justifying the reasons for their decision.
There may be factors other than economic benefits and costs
that agencies will want to weigh in decisions, such as equity
within and across generations. In addition, a decisionmaker6  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
may want to place greater weight on particular characteristics
of a decision, such as potential irreversible consequences.
Principle 6: For legislative proposals involving major health, safety,
and environmental regulations, the Congressional Budget Office
should do a preliminary benefit-cost analysis that can inform legis-
lative decisionmaking.
Because laws give rise to regulations, some kind of benefit-
cost analysis is likely to be useful in informing the policy
process. Such a benefit-cost analysis will, of necessity, be
quite rough since it is difficult to estimate the economic
impact of a proposed law before the regulations based on
that law are written. Although a full-blown benefit-cost analy-
sis may not be warranted in many cases, a rough benefit-
cost analysis will often be quite useful.
Part Two: Suggestions for Improving the
Quality of Economic Analysis Used in
Regulatory Decisionmaking
Principle 7: While benefit-cost analysis should focus primarily on
the overall relationship between benefits and costs, a good benefit-
cost analysis will identify important distributional consequences
of a policy.
Available data often permit reliable estimation of major
policy impacts on important subgroups of the population.
If a regulation results in economic spillovers that contrib-
ute to significant job losses or increased costs to a specific
industry in a local economy, then it is appropriate to con-
sider those in a benefit-cost analysis. Agencies should, how-
ever, weigh those impacts against positive impacts that result
elsewhere in the larger economy. Usually, it is better to ad-
dress concerns about local economic spillover effects ofARROW ET AL. 7
regulation by using tax and transfer policies rather than
regulatory policy.
Regulation typically affects the distribution of employ-
ment among industries rather than the general employ-
ment level. Usually, any specific regulation has a very minor
effect on either wages or employment in the industry to
which it applies. Regardless of the size of the employment
effect, the appropriate measure of regulatory costs is the
transition costs of employees who are forced to switch jobs
because of the regulation. In those few cases where regula-
tion can have a significant impact on total employment,
such as the minimum wage, the effect on consumers and
producers should also be estimated.
Principle 8: It is important to identify the incremental benefits
and costs associated with different regulatory policies.
A problem with many regulatory analyses is that they fail to
specify a clear baseline. Doing so is a necessary first step in
identifying the incremental benefits and costs of a proposed
policy. Defining a clear baseline can help avoid problems
with double counting. For example, some regulatory analy-
ses have counted as benefits positive changes that would
have occurred even if the regulations were not implemented.
In addition to specifying a clear baseline, we think it is
useful for the analyst to consider an array of practical alter-
natives for pursuing a particular statutory or regulatory
objective, while carefully noting the incremental benefits
and costs associated with those alternatives. For example,
almost all of the harm from a polluting process can fre-
quently be eliminated for a reasonable cost, while an astro-
nomical cost is required to remove the last, small amount
of harm. A benefit-cost analysis that considers only a no-
treatment baseline and a full-treatment alternative may find
that benefits exceed the costs under full treatment. If the
analysis had considered a partial-treatment case, however,
the net benefits to consumers could be higher still. In that8  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
example, separate consideration of low-cost and high-cost
alternatives makes it easier for the decisionmaker to select
the low-cost remedy when it is appropriate.
Principle 9: Benefits and costs of proposed policies should be quan-
tified wherever possible. Best estimates should be presented along
with a description of the uncertainties.
In most instances, it should be possible to describe the ef-
fects of proposed policy changes in quantitative terms.
Quantification of benefits and costs is useful, even where
there are large uncertainties. Available methods and data
generally imply ranges of possible values of benefits and
costs, not single numbers. Benefit-cost analysis contributes
most to intelligent decisionmaking when those ranges are
clearly described along with best estimates. Best estimates
should reflect expected values.
If the decisionmaker wishes to introduce a “margin of
safety” into his decision, he should do so explicitly. Assump-
tions should be stated clearly rather than be hidden within
the analysis.
Principle 10: Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to ensure that quan-
titative factors do not dominate important qualitative factors in
decisionmaking.
A common critique of benefit-cost analysis is that it does
not emphasize factors that are not easily quantified or mon-
etized. That critique has merit. There are two principal ways
to address it: first, quantify as many factors as are reason-
able and quantify or characterize the relevant uncertain-
ties; and second, give due consideration to factors that defy
quantification but are thought to be important.
Principle 11: The more external review regulatory analyses re-
ceive, the better they are likely to be.ARROW ET AL. 9
External review includes peer-reviewed studies as well as
studies reviewed by an agency other than the one doing
the study. Historically, the Office of Management and Bud-
get has played a key role in reviewing selected major regu-
lations, particularly those aimed at protecting the
environment, health, and safety. We think that such a role
is appropriate for any regulation whose annual economic
cost is expected to be greater than $100 million.
Peer review of economic analyses should be used for
regulations with potentially large economic impacts (for
example, those whose annual economic cost exceeds $1
billion). The reviewers should be selected on the basis of
their demonstrated expertise and reputation.
Retrospective assessments of selected regulatory im-
pact analyses should also be done periodically by an inde-
pendent group of scholars to address systematic problems
that have arisen. Because environmental, health, and safety
regulatory decisions can have important impacts on the
economy, it is useful to review periodically the quality of
economic analysis that aids in the decisionmaking process.
An outside panel of experts, primarily consisting of econo-
mists and other scientists, could provide recommendations
on how such analyses could be improved. The panel could
be selected by the National Academy of Sciences.
Principle 12: A core set of economic assumptions should be used
in calculating benefits and costs associated with environmental,
health, and safety regulation. Key variables include the social dis-
count rate, the value of reducing risks of dying and accidents, and
the value associated with other improvements in health.
There are benefits from being able to compare results across
analyses, including potentially large gains in economic ef-
ficiency. A common set of economic assumptions facilitates
such comparisons. For example, a common set of assump-
tions can be used to develop values for improvements in
environmental quality.10  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
Agencies should be allowed to use alternative assump-
tions, so long as those assumptions are clearly stated. They
should then compare the results based on those assump-
tions with the results based on the common set of assump-
tions. Where possible, agencies should explain the
economic rationale for employing alternative assumptions.
Principle 13: Information should be presented clearly and suc-
cinctly in a regulatory impact analysis. Transparency is necessary
if benefit-cost analysis is to inform decisionmaking.
It is very important in conducting a benefit-cost analysis
that agencies spell out all key assumptions clearly and high-
light uncertainties. Both the executive summary and the
report itself should be easily accessible to people who are
familiar with basic economic concepts. References for key
estimates should be provided.
The executive summary of the analysis should present
key assumptions and results for the base case and sensitiv-
ity analyses. That summary should include information on
the net present value of benefits and costs and the stream
of benefits and costs for all cases that the analysis examines
in detail. It should also highlight key factors that have been
quantified as well as those that have not. Finally, the sum-
mary should identify incremental net benefits from select-
ing different alternatives.
Principle 14: A single  agency should set key economic values for
evaluating regulations and should develop a standard format for
presenting the results of a regulatory impact analysis.
A single agency, such as the Office of Management and
Budget, should specify key economic values for use in evalu-
ating proposed regulations. That approach will ensure that
there is some consistency across agency evaluations. Those
values should be revised periodically on the basis of new
information.ARROW ET AL. 11
A single agency, such as the Office of Management
and Budget, should also develop a standard format for pre-
senting key assumptions and results. That format should
make it easier for decisionmakers and interested parties to
review principal findings.
Principle 15: Whenever possible, values used for monetizing ben-
efits and costs should be based on tradeoffs that individuals would
make, either directly or, as is often the case, indirectly in labor,
housing, or other markets.
Benefit-cost analysis is premised on the notion that the val-
ues to be assigned to program effects—favorable or unfa-
vorable—are those of the affected individuals, not the values
held by economists, moral philosophers, or others. Valua-
tion will be difficult, and in some cases impossible, when
individuals are unwilling or unable to substitute one com-
modity or service for another.
Because one seldom knows whose life will be pro-
longed or whose health will be improved by a regulatory
program, it is generally appropriate to value small reduc-
tions in the risk of morbidity or premature mortality for
each individual. Typically, individuals are willing to trade
off other amenities, goods, or services for slight reductions
in risk. The values they reveal depend on both the type of
risk and the number of additional years of life they would
enjoy from reduced risk. Other things being equal, a pro-
gram that prevents a serious illness should be valued more
highly than one that prevents a minor ailment. Similarly, a
program that extends a life by thirty years should be valued
more highly than one that extends it for three years. Where
policies are expected to extend a life, it is better to esti-
mate the number of life-years extended than just the num-
ber of lives.
Principle 16: Given uncertainties in identifying the correct dis-
count rate, it is appropriate to employ a range of rates. Ideally, the12  BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND REGULATION
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same range of discount rates should be used in all regulatory analyses.
Both economic efficiency and intergenerational equity re-
quire that benefits and costs experienced in future years
be given less weight in decisionmaking than those experi-
enced today. The rate at which future benefits and costs
should be discounted to present values will generally not
equal the rate of return on private investment. The discount
rate should instead be based on how individuals trade off
current for future consumption.ARROW ET AL. 13
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